Memo To: Art Laffer
From: Jude Wanniski
Re: You Were Right!
Remember when I asked you in 1971, when you were chief economist at the Office of Management and Budget for Nixon, who is the best economist in the world? You said without hesitation: "A Canadian economist, Robert Mundell." My reaction: Huh? Never heard of him. I took your word for it, though, and after finally meeting him in May 1974, I could see what you meant. What great news, Art, that our boy is finally recognized with the Nobel Prize in economics. Funny how just yesterday I e-mailed him asking if he had heard anything from Stockholm and this morning I wake up to the news that he gets the honor and the million bucks that he so richly deserves. I know it will take a little longer, but history eventually will note that it was Mundell who made it possible for Ronald Reagan to be elected President. Without Bob reviving supply-side classical economics, at a time when the economic universe thought it was dead and buried for good, the Gipper would never have had the intellectual support he needed for his bold pledge to cut tax rates in the 1980 campaign. We should throw a party for him, don't you think, and invite all the original supply-siders, for a roast and a toast, to the most important economist of our time! I've already recommended to Bob Bartley that he re-run the Mundell interview I did in 1974 for The Wall Street Journal. You probably have forgotten it yourself, it has been so long ago, but it really was the whole agenda wrapped up in about a thousand words. This was the piece Jack Kemp read that sent him into orbit, leading him to develop the Kemp-Roth tax-cut legislation with Senator Bill Roth of Delaware, the centerpiece of the Reagan campaign in 1980! Here is the interview, one more time. Please note the unfinished business... we still have to make the dollar as good as gold! The optimal currency area is the world!
It's Time to Cut Taxes
The Wall Street Journal
DECEMBER 11, 1974
Robert A. Mundell, a Canadian economist now at Columbia University, does not believe the United States can Whip Inflation Now and climb out of the deepening recession by harking to either the classical economic advice of tight money and balanced budgets or to the neo-Keynesian nostrum of easier money, public-service employment and wage-and-price controls.
The correct prescription, says Professor Mundell, is a $30 billion tax cut and the temporary halting of open-market operations by the Federal Reserve to assure monetary restraint.
Furthermore, asserts the placid professor, whose voice in conversation rarely rises above a whisper, if this medicine is not taken soon, there will be by mid-1975 more than seven million or even eight million Americans unemployed, an inflation rate perhaps double the consensus prediction of 7% per annum, and a huge budget deficit arising from the recession-level tax revenues and widespread company and household bankruptcies.
Professor Mundell's prescription is obviously not part of mainstream thinking in the United States, but it bears consideration for no other reason than the 42-year-old Canadian's standing and reputation among international economists. "He's the most creative, innovative international economist I know of," says Harold B. VanCleveland, vice president and economist at First National City Bank. Sir Roy Harrod, J.M.Keynes' biographer, has toasted him as one of the "greatest economists in the world." And Lord Robbins, chairman of the court of governors of the London School of Economics, said of him at the Bologna conference on global inflation in 1971: "Bob -- and here I lay down a sociological law -- is seldom wrong. And even when you disagree with him, you must disagree with your hat in the hand."
The heart of the current problem, Mr. Mundell believes, lies in the international arena. Inflation is, and has been for several years, a global phenomenon. The collapse of discipline of the balance of payments has unleashed a wave of inflation on the world. He believes that the eventual solution must involve not only control of the dollar supply produced in the United States, but regulation of the Eurodollar market, the restabilization of gold and a return to the fixed system. With Professor Arthur B. Laffer of the University of Chicago, he has worked out an economic model to deal with this problem.
To deal with the immediate crisis of simultaneous inflation and recession, though, Professor Mundell departs from the traditional belief that monetary and fiscal policies should always be working in the same direction. He believes that inflation and unemployment are separable problems and that to combat them distinct policy instruments are required. He believes that tight money should be used to combat the inflation, while expansive fiscal policies -- preferably through lower taxes -- can be used to combat the recession in a way that also works against inflation.
A Cause of Inflation
He argues that monetary expansion no longer works as a means of stimulating production; it simply causes inflation. To some degree and for short periods it may have been a reasonably good anti-cyclical weapon during the best years of the Bretton Woods system. But now, in the regime of floating exchange rates, monetary stimulation by the Fed not only increases wage demands, but is immediately perceived by the foreign-exchange markets, causing depreciation of the dollar and an automatic increase in the price of imports. This raises costs and aggravates inflation directly. It also raises wages and thus quickly shows up in the Cost of Living Index.
To eliminate at least this cause of inflation, he says the Fed should temporarily halt open-market purchases of government securities, the traditional means through which it increases the basic money supply. The thrust of demand expansion must come from fiscal stimuli, and when the U.S. economy responds to that stimulus, growth in the real money supply can come about through a resumption in open-market purchases. At the same time, the reviving U.S. economy would draw money from Europe and the Middle East and thus protect the U.S. balance of payments. Something else would occur as the economy's growth responds to the fiscal stimulus while monetary growth is checked. The dollar would appreciate against foreign currencies, which means the U.S. would then be able to buy a greater share of the world's goods and services with the same number of dollars.
Real economic growth would be stimulated by the big tax cut on both personal and corporate incomes. He would adjust income tax brackets across the board and index them to correct for future inflation, as is now the practice in Canada, and he would get the corporate tax bite down closer to Canada's 40%.
"The level of U.S. taxes has become a drag on economic growth in the United States," he says. "The national economy is being choked by taxes -- asphyxiated. Taxes have increased even while output has fallen, because of the inflation. The unemployment has created vast segments of excess capacity greater than the size of the entire Belgian economy. If you could put that sub-economy to work, you would not only eliminate the social and economic costs of unemployment, you would increase aggregate supply sufficiently to reduce inflation. It is simply absurd to argue that increasing unemployment will stop inflation. To stop inflation you need more goods, not less."
As it is, he believes U.S. policymakers are unwittingly creating a larger sub-economy of the unemployed guaranteed to reduce aggregate supply, and thereby aggravate inflation. A $30 billion tax cut implies a large initial federal deficit. But if taxes are not cut now, the size of the unemployed sub-economy will expand. Tax revenues of state, local and federal governments will decline. At the same time their outlays for unemployment relief and welfare will expand. Combined government deficits might even exceed the amount implied by a tax cut. But what's worse, the nation would be no closer to turning the economy around. He disagrees with both the Keynesians and the classical economists on the economic effects of a tax cut. "The Keynesians only look at its effect on demand and have always considered it inflationary," he says. "They neglect the financing side, aggregate supply and inventory effects."
"The classical economists are only concerned about the ‘crowding-out' effect," by which he means the effect of deficit financing on the private capital market, i.e., government financing needs crowd out private borrowing that would otherwise go into capital expansion. "Both of these extreme views do not see that there is a middle position."
A tax cut not only increases demand, but increases the incentive to produce. "The government budget recycles tax dollars into the spending stream through expenditures, but in so doing it reduces the incentive to produce and lowers total production. After all, if total taxes and expenditures become confiscatory, all economic activity would cease and the government tax bite would be 100% of nothing." With lower taxes, it is more attractive to invest and more attractive to work; demand is increased but so is supply.
So too with the "crowding-out" effect, an argument against tax cuts that was popular in the 1920s. The government sale of bonds to finance a tax cut indeed crowds private borrowers out of the capital market. This is only one effect, he says. Four other things occur. Because capital and labor are the main recipients of the proceeds of the government bond sale that finances the tax cut, they are in effect receiving as a gift $30 billion they would otherwise have to borrow. In this sense, they are happily crowded out of the credit market.
Secondly, the finance required for the tax cut would be less than what would be needed if the recession is allowed to deepen. Third, Professor Mundell believes the size of the credit pool would automatically expand as the prospect of real economic growth engendered by the tax cut allows a recovery of real savings. That is, dollar holders will have a higher incentive to invest in capital goods the larger and more rapid is the recovery from the recession. The fourth effect is that the bond sale method of financing the tax cut will draw money from abroad.
Helping Capital Flows
The international effects of a tax cut are particularly important, he asserts. With announcement of a major tax cut, the capital market would instantly perceive that it is more profitable to do business in the United States than the rest of the world. Capital that is now flowing out would remain; foreign capital going elsewhere would come in. The increased real economic growth would mean the U.S. would run a sizable trade deficit as the U.S. would keep more of what it produces and buy more goods from abroad. Offsetting this in the short run would be an inventory effect caused by tighter monetary conditions; the expectation of slower inflation would cause a reduction in optimal inventory levels.
There would be a balance of payments equilibrium, he says, because the capital flows would cover any residual trade deficit until market opportunities were arbitraged world-wide. The U.S. tax cut would help to pull the whole industrial world out of its slump, he maintains.
In a real sense, he sees the $30 billion tax cut as a future public's investment in the current private, productive sector of the economy that is now unutilized. He argues that the unemployed sub-economy would respond not only by producing goods and services sufficient to repay the bonds, but would meanwhile sustain itself with output and would not have to be carried by the government dole. Six months from now, perhaps $30 billion of that potential output will have been irretrievably lost and the economy will be in much worse shape than it is right now.
As he sees it, there is not now any self-corrective economic force acting to pull the economy out of its inflationary nosedive. At present there is no control of international reserves and even the value of gold gets indexed with inflation. "Inflation itself breeds even more money which in turn breeds more inflation." There was self-correction to an economic slump during the days of the gold-exchange standard, when deflation raised the purchasing power of gold, and self-correction to inflation when inflation reduced gold's purchasing power. There is none of this today in a world of floating exchange rates, he says. The nation's economic problems feed on themselves.
"They feed on themselves through the effects of inflation on the progressive income-tax schedules and through the negative multiplier effects thus generated," says Professor Mundell. "They feed on themselves through the ever-increasing percentage increases in wages needed to maintain workers' purchasing power. And they feed on themselves through the international escalation of world money supplies that has taken place since the breakdown of the gold-exchange standard. The $30 billion tax cut is needed immediately to arrest the world slump, and if it is delayed by even one month, the figure required will be higher."